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ABSTRACT: We present a corpus comprising the first general election debate between Clinton and Trump 
(17,190 words) annotated with types of argument on the basis of the Periodic Table of Arguments. This 
extends the annotation of an existing corpus (97,999 words) of transcripts of television debates and 
associated reactions on the Reddit social media platform, annotated on the basis of Inference Anchoring 
Theory with relations of inference, conflict and rephrase, and their illocutionary discourse anchoring.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we present the US2016G1tvWAGEMANS corpus, a freely available 
resource of empirical data on argument schemes. The corpus consists of transcripts of 
television debates leading up to the 2016 presidential elections in the United States, 
combined with reactions to these debates on the Reddit social media platform. The 
annotation of the corpus consists of two layers. The whole corpus (97,999 words) was 
annotated (Visser et al. 2018a) on the basis of Inference Anchoring Theory (Reed & 
Budzynska, 2011), with argumentative relations of inference, conflict and rephrase, and 
their dialogical anchoring by means of illocutionary connections (see Section 3). The 
annotation of a sub-corpus containing the first general election television debate (17,190 
words) is extended by classifying the argument schemes on the basis of a factorial 
approach to argument classification called the Periodic Table of Arguments (Wagemans, 
2016) (see Section 2).  
The Periodic Table of Arguments classification is based on three discriminating 
properties: first-/second-order arguments; predicate/subject arguments; propositions of 
fact/value/policy. The individual propositions and inference relations in all arguments are 
annotated with the three properties (see Section 4). The results on the three distinctions 
are then combined for each argument and mapped to the Periodic Table of Arguments’ 
technical classifications (such as ‘1 pre FF’, a first-order predicate argument relating two 
factual propositions) (see Section 5).  
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The US2016G1tvWAGEMANS corpus serves as an open resource of empirical 
data on argument schemes (see Section 6). It can inform the identification of isotopes of 
the 36 systematic characterisations of arguments in the Periodic Table, and be used to 
review the appropriateness of the three discriminating properties. The corpus also serves 
as a resource for argument mining (the automated reconstruction of argumentative 
discourse). The development of the machine learning techniques that are popular for 
argument mining is dependent on the availability of large quantities of uniformly 
annotated data, which US2016G1tvWAGEMANS provides. 
 
 
2. THE PERIODIC TABLE OF ARGUMENTS 
 
For identifying the types of arguments in the corpus, we made use of a factorial approach 
to argument classification called the Periodic Table of Arguments (Wagemans, 2016). 
Within this approach, an argument type is conceived as a characterization of an inference 
relation, i.e., the specific way in which a premise supports a conclusion. The theoretical 
framework of the table consists of the following three independent, partial characteristics 
of arguments. 
 
2.1 First-order arguments and second-order arguments 
 
The approach assumes that premises and conclusions of arguments are expressed by 
categorical propositions consisting of a subject term (S) and a predicate term (P), giving 
an argument the general form “SC is PC, because SP is PP”. The distinction between first-
order and second-order arguments hinges on the possibility of breaking down the subject 
term of the proposition expressed in the premise of the argument (SP). If this element 
cannot be broken down any further, the argument is characterised as a first-order 
argument (“1”). An example is “The suspect was driving fast, because he left a long trace 
of rubber on the road”, which has “he” as the subject of the premise. If this element can 
be broken down, for instance because  it consists of the categorical proposition expressed 
in the conclusion (SC is PC), the argument is characterized as a second-order argument 
(“2”). An example is “We only use 10% of our brain, because Einstein said so”, which 
has the conclusion functioning as the subject of the premise and “is said by Einstein” as 
the predicate of the premise. In this case, the general form is instantiated as “SC is PC, 
because (SC is PC) is PP”. 
  
2.2 Predicate arguments and subject arguments 
 
If the subject of the proposition expressed in the premise is identical to that in the 
conclusion, the underlying mechanism of the argument is based on a relation between the 
(different) predicates. Such an argument is characterized as a predicate argument (“pre”) 
and has the general form “a is X, because a is Y”. Both examples mentioned above can be 
viewed as predicate arguments (“being true” functioning as the unexpressed predicate of 
the conclusion in the case of the second-order argument). If the predicate of the 
proposition expressed in the premise is identical to that in the conclusion, the underlying 
mechanism of the argument is based on a relation between the (different) subjects. In this 
case, the argument is characterised as a subject argument (“sub”) and has as its general 
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form “a is X, because b is X”. An example is “Biking on the lawn is forbidden, because 
walking on the lawn is forbidden”.   
 
2.3 Types of propositions 
 
Finally, arguments are characterized on the basis of the specific combination of types of 
propositions they instantiate. For this purpose, the approach distinguishes between 
propositions of fact (F) such as “Investing in solar energy will diminish CO2-emission”, 
propositions of value (V) such as “Investing in solar energy is a good idea”, and 
propositions of policy (P) such as “The UK should invest in solar energy”. After 
determining the type of proposition expressed in the conclusion and the premise, the 
argument is characterised as a PP, PV, PF, VP, VV, VF, FP, FV, or FF argument. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Visualisation of the four quadrants of the Periodic Table of Arguments. 
 
2.4 Factorial full characterisation 
 
After having performed these three analyses, they are combined into a full 
characterisation of the argument type. The resulting possible characterisations can be 
visualised in a Periodic Table based on the distinctive partial argument characteristics. 
Figure 1 shows a subset of argument types classified into four quadrants: the a quadrant 
groups the first-order predicate argument types (“1 pre”), the b quadrant contains the 
first-order subject arguments (“1 sub”), the g quadrant covers the second-order subject 
arguments (“2 sub”), and the d quadrant the second-order predicate arguments (“2 pre”). 
The argument types in the four quadrants are then further subdivided based on the 
combinations of different types of propositions employed as conclusion or premise. For 
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example, “The suspect was driving fast, because he left a long trace of rubber on the 
road”, would be characterised as a “1 pre FF” argument, i.e. a first-order predicate 
argument (a quadrant) combining a proposition of fact with another proposition of fact. 
This approach to argument classification is factorial in that the theoretical framework of 
the Periodic Table of Arguments leads to 2 x 2 x 9 = 36 full characterisations of 
arguments.1 
 
 
3. A CORPUS OF TELEVISED ELECTION DEBATES 
 
3.1 The 2016 US presidential election debates 
 
The US2016 corpus comprises transcripts of televised debates for the 2016 presidential 
elections in the United States of America. These debates constitute a type of 
communicative activity within the political domain. The context in which communication 
takes place influences the argumentative activity, as it determines, e.g., the outcomes 
aimed for, the roles of the participants involved, and the rules or conventions with respect 
to the argumentative means available to them (van Eemeren, 2010). The interests and 
values of the individual participants further shape the practice (Fairclough, 2006): the 
context of televised election debates is heavily influenced by the candidates' objective to 
persuade the electorate to vote for them, and the broadcasting networks' aim of providing 
a fair and well-viewed platform for doing so. 
Ever since the first televised election debate between the then US presidential 
candidates John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in 1960, the debates have played an 
important role in the democratic process in many countries (Kraus, 2013). The general 
election and the associated television debates between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump 
as the candidates for the two dominant political parties in the US (respectively the 
Democratic Party and the Republican Party) took place in the Autumn of 2016.2 Prior to 
the general elections, both main parties held primary elections and caucuses to elect their 
party’s candidate for the presidency. These primaries were also preceded by television 
debates between the leading prospective candidates in 2015 and 2016.  
While the format of each of the debates is slightly different, there are some 
recurring characteristics. Being television debates, the discourse is spoken, with 
transcripts available retrospectively through a variety of sources, and video recordings 
broadcast live and available afterwards. The participants are expected to use language 
that is appropriate for the occasion. A selection of a limited number of candidates is 
invited to these events, moderated by anchors and journalists from the television 
networks that air them (among others, CBS, CNN, Fox News, and NBC).  
The television networks' moderators pose questions to the invited candidates, and 
guide the debate (for example by keeping time and order), while the candidates make 
opening statements, answer the moderators' (and occasionally the public's) questions, 
defend their views and challenge those of their political opponents, in an attempt to 
garner more support among the electorate. For the general elections, three television 																																																								
1 More information about the Periodic Table of Arguments is also available online at www.periodic-table-
of-arguments.org. 
 2	In the current paper, we focus exclusively on the debates between the (prospective) candidates of the two 
dominant parties in US politics.	
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debates were organised between Democratic candidate Clinton and Republican candidate 
Trump, and one debate between their candidate vice-presidents. For the primaries, the 
Republican party held 12 debates for the front-runners and seven so-called `undercard' 
debates between the next tier of candidates. The Democratic party held 10 primary 
debates. As time went on and more of the candidates withdrew their candidacy, the 
number of participants declined over the course of these series of debates.  
The argumentation encountered in the debates is not always nicely signalled 
linguistically, or even and intuitively clear. The television debates are a spoken genre of 
discourse, such that the history of the dialogue is not entirely available to the participants 
– depending on their memory, of course – which may lead to repetitions and 
contradictions of what was said earlier. Furthermore, candidates cannot always rely on 
their prepared and practised lines and topics, but have to respond to unexpected turns and 
twists, and to interaction with the other candidates and moderators. Because responding 
well to such dynamic situations is expected to instil the voters' confidence in the 
candidate, candidates receive support to varying degrees from communication 
professionals in their preparation and training, and rely on their experience in political 
debating.  
The context of televised election debates fosters a mixture of well-structured and 
well-presented argumentation that appears to have been prepared in advance, and 
impromptu argumentation originating from the need to cope with the interactional 
dynamics. The level of noise in the data – in terms of e.g. crosstalk, unconventional use 
of discourse markers, and low discourse cohesion – poses a challenge in the analysis of 
the argumentation. Consider Example (1), advanced by then prospective candidate (now 
President) Trump.3  Trump anticipates his claim about the topic of immigration to not be 
accepted outright. He therefore supports it with multiple statements, but does so in a non-
straightforward fashion. Upon closer inspection, Trump's support relies mostly on the 
rhetorical device of repetition, with several of his assertions constituting a relation of 
rephrase rather than inference. By relying on varying ways of presenting the same content 
within a superficially inferential reasoning structure, Trump introduces an element of 
circularity. 
 
(1)  Donald Trump: So, if it weren't for me, you wouldn't even be talking about illegal 
immigration, Chris. You wouldn't even be talking about it. This was not a subject 
that was on anybody's mind until I brought it up at my announcement. And I said, 
Mexico is sending. Except the reporters, because they're a very dishonest lot, 
generally speaking, in the world of politics, they didn't cover my statement the 
way I said it. 
 
In addition to the annotated transcripts of the television debates, the US2016 corpus 
contains annotated social media posts extracted from Reddit. The communicative context 
of social media posts leads to different conventions and communicative characteristics. 
Since, in the current paper, we only focus on a television debate sub-corpus of US2016, 
we will not go into detail on the Reddit sub-corpora – these are reported on elsewhere 
(Visser et al., 2018a). 
 																																																								3	The annotation of example (1) – taken from our corpus of the first Republican primaries television debate 
on 6 August 2015 in Cleveland, Ohio – is available online at aifdb.org/argview/10829.	
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3.2 Annotation with Inference Anchoring Theory 
 
Four annotators, trained in the use of Inference Anchoring Theory (IAT) (Reed & 
Budzynska, 2011), annotated the US2016 corpus that we take as a case in point in the 
current paper. Building on insights from discourse analysis and argumentation studies, 
IAT explains argumentative conduct in terms of the anchoring of argumentative 
reasoning in communicative interaction. Drawing on Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1962; 
Searle, 1969), the anchoring is theoretically conceptualised as the `illocutionary 
connection' between locutions in dialogue and their propositional content. IAT then 
allows the analytical concepts and annotations to be represented in terms of the Argument 
Interchange Format ontology (Chesñevar et al., 2006), resulting in a graph-based 
representation that facilitates the computational processing of data and procedures.  
The annotation guidelines, summarised below, are based on IAT. The full version 
of the guidelines (available online at arg.tech/US2016-guidelines) deals with, among 
others: anaphoric references, epistemic modalities, repetitions, punctuation, discourse 
indicators, interposed text, reported speech, and how to deal with context-specific 
peculiarities.  
 
- Segments divide the (transcribed) text into locutions, consisting of a speaker 
designation and an `argumentative discourse unit' (a text span with discrete 
argumentative function) (Peldszus & Stede, 2013). 
 
- Transitions capture the functional relationships between locutions, reflecting the 
dialogue protocol – a high level specification of the set of transition types that are 
available in a particular communicative activity. 
 
- Illocutionary connections embody the intended communicative functions of 
locutions or transitions, such as: Agreeing, Arguing, Asserting, (three sub-types 
of) Challenging, Disagreeing, (three sub-types of) Questioning, Restating, and 
Default Illocuting (when none of the other types suffice). Some types of 
illocutionary connection lead to the reconstruction of a propositional content. 
 
- Inferences are directed relations between propositions, reflecting that a 
proposition is meant to supply a reason for accepting another proposition. A 
specific argument scheme (e.g., Argument from Example or Argument from 
Expert Opinion) can be specified; failing that, it is labelled as Default Inference. 
 
- Conflicts are directed relations between propositions, reflecting that a 
proposition is meant to be incompatible with another proposition or relation. Such 
incompatibility may depend on, e.g., logical Contradiction or pragmatic 
Contrariness, or the annotated relation may default to Default Conflict. 
 
- Rephrases are directed relations between propositions, reflecting that a 
proposition is meant to be a reformulation of another proposition. Such 
reformulation may involve, e.g., Specialisation, Generalisation or Instantiation, 
or the relation defaults to Default Rephrase. 
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The annotation has been validated by means of calculating the inter-annotator agreement 
on a 11.3% sample, resulting in a Cohen’s (1960) κ of 0.610, and a CASS (Duthie et al., 
2016) κ of 0.752 – both indicating substantial agreement according to Landis and Koch’s 
1977) standard interpretation of the kappa metric. The resulting annotated US2016 corpus 
is freely available online at corpora.aifdb.org/US2016. We compiled some of the 
quantitative characteristics of the US2016 corpus in Table 1. Additionally, the table 
contains the properties of the US2016G1tv sub-corpus, the extended annotation of which 
we discuss in the current paper. Aside from a basic word count, Table 1 comprises counts 
of, e.g., locutions (text segments), some illocutions, arguments (‘inference’), and 
counterarguments (‘conflict’).  
 
 
 
Table 1. Quantitative annotation properties of the US2016 and US2016G1tv corpora. 
 
 
4. ANNOTATION WITH THE PERIODIC TABLE OF ARGUMENTS 
 
The annotation of argument schemes on the basis of the Periodic Table of Arguments is 
treated as an extension of the existing IAT-annotated argument structure of US2016G1tv. 
Because the typology of the Periodic Table of Arguments is based on the interplay 
between three distinguishing characteristics of the arguments, the annotation task has 
been deconstructed into three partial classification sub-tasks. Two annotators trained in 
annotation with the Periodic Table of Arguments, each carried out the three classification 
sub-tasks on 55% of the inferential relations and the related propositions of the 
US2016G1tv corpus. Based on those partial results an aggregated final classification of 
the argumentative inferences is produced with one of the 36 possible main types of the 
Periodic Table of Arguments (e.g. 1 pre FF). If any of the inference relations or 
propositions involved in an argument cannot be classified, this leads to a classification as 
Default Inference in the final aggregation step. Similarly, any inference relation involving 
several premises without a dominant proposition type is labelled Default Inference. 
 
 
4.1 Annotation guidelines 
 
- First-order and second-order arguments: An inference relation is classified as 
first-order if it connects two propositions each containing a subject-predicate pair. 
An inference relation is classified as second-order if its premise is a locution 
(often the result of reported speech), or if the premise is otherwise applying a 
predicate to the full proposition in the conclusion. 
 
September 2016
tificatory defence, refutatory incompatibility, and revisionary reformulation. The propo-
sitional relations ar modelled as sub-types of S-nodes: as RA-, CA-, and MA-nodes.
3.3. The US2016G1tv corpus
In Table 1, we have collected the most relevant properties of the 17,190 word (tokens)
US2016G1tv corpus. For reference, we also include those of the full US2016 corpus
comprising almost 100,000 words. The properties are retrieved automatically using the
Argument Analytics module [17] of the Argument Web [3] at analytics.arg.tech.
Both corpora are freely available online through AIFdb Corpora [18] (at corpora.
aifdb.org). In Table 1, we include counts of Arguing, Disagreeing and Restating as
the illocutionary connections most commonly used to anchor argumentatively relevant
relations between propositions.
Table 1. Properties of the US2016 and US2016G1tv corpora.
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4. Annotation with Walton’s Classification of Argument Schemes
4.1. Walton’s Classification of Argument Schemes
Walton’s longstanding scholarly engagement with the topic of argument schemes, within
various domains and from various angles, has resulted in an eclectic collection of
schemes conventionally occurring in argumentative practices, ranging from colloquial
discussion to argumentation in the legal domain (see, e.g., [35,38]). Some of Walton’s
schemes are commonly distinguished in dialectical or informal-logical approaches to ar-
gumentation (e.g. argument from sign or argument from cause to effect). Others, however,
are more exotic or highly specialised (e.g. argument from arbitrariness of a verbal classi-
fication or argument from plea for excuse), are closer to modes of persuasion in a rhetor-
ical perspective on argumentation (e.g. ethotic argument), or would by some be read-
ily relegated to the realm of fallacies (e.g. hasty generalisation). The list also includes
composite schemes that combine aspects from various schemes into one (e.g. practical
reasoning from analogy combining practical reasoning and argument from analogy).
Despite several proposals to systematise Walton’s schemeset by imposing some or-
dering principle on the resulting typology (see, e.g., the distinction between the classes of
‘reasoni g’, ‘source-based arguments’ and ‘applying rules to cases’ in [38, pp.347–363],
and the subsequent [37]), to the best of our knowledge, no exhaustive and systematic ac-
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- Predicate and subject arguments: An inference relation is classified as a 
predicate argument if the propositions involved share the same subject term to 
which different predicates are applied, and as a subject argument if vice versa. 
This classification is made more complicated by the fact that natural language 
generally does not neatly follow the subject-predicate structure of categorical 
propositions, while the IAT analysis does not mandate such reconstruction of 
propositions either. This means that the annotator has to make a reconstructive 
interpretation of the proposition as if it were a categorical proposition, to then 
categorise it – in order to respect the starting point of not changing the original 
annotation aside from classifying the types of argumentative inferences, i.e. 
argument schemes. 
 
- Propositions of fact, value and policy: A proposition is classified as a 
proposition of fact if its veracity can be verified through empirical observation, as 
a proposition of value if it contains some evaluation (whether ethical, aesthetical, 
legal, or logical), and as a proposition of policy if it expresses an act or policy to 
be carried out.  
 
4.2 Validation 
 
The annotation guidelines are validated by calculating the inter-annotator agreement for 
the three partial classifications, as well as for the final aggregated schemes. For the 
classification of first-order and second-order arguments, a random sample of 10.0% was 
annotated by both annotators, resulting in a Cohen’s κ of 0.658. While generally not 
considered a low κ – still amounting to substantial agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977) – 
this is the lowest inter-annotator agreement of all three sub-tasks. The lower score is a 
result of the set of arguments being unbalanced with a preponderance of first-order 
arguments: 481 first-order to only 11 second-order arguments). This imbalance throws 
off the calculation of the Cohen’s κ metric, as becomes clear when calculating the 
corresponding percentage agreement of 98.0% between the two annotators. 
Also on a 10.0% sample, the classification of predicate/subject arguments results 
in a Cohen’s κ of 0.851. The classification of propositions as fact/value/policy yields a 
Cohen’s κ of 0.778 on a 13.4% sample. The inter-annotator agreement for the aggregated 
argument scheme classification is based on a 10.4% sample, resulting in a Cohen’s κ of 
0.689. This means that the partial and final annotations all fall within the range of 
substantial to almost perfect agreement.  
 
 
5. THE US2016G1tvWAGEMANS CORPUS 
 
The annotation of argument schemes based on the Periodic Table of Arguments is 
compiled in the US2016G1tvWAGEMANS corpus (available online at corpora.aifdb.org/ 
US2016G1tvWAGEMANS). Each of the previously annotated argumentative inference 
relations in the US2016G1tv corpus has been labelled on the basis of the three 
distinguishing characteristics defined by the Periodic Table. For example, Clinton’s 
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argument in (2) is classed as a 1 pre PV argument.4 Clinton defends a policy proposal (P) 
(people on the terrorist watch list should be restricted from buying a gun), by drawing an 
analogy to a value statement (V) (people on the terrorist watch list are too dangerous to 
fly). She does so by means of two first-order propositions (1), that share a common 
subject term (pre) (people on the terrorist watch list).  
 
(2)  CLINTON: And we finally need to pass a prohibition on anyone who's on the 
terrorist watch list from being able to buy a gun in our country. If you're too 
dangerous to fly, you are too dangerous to buy a gun. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Results for annotation sub-tasks of distinguishing first-/second-order and subject/predicate 
arguments, and propositions of value/policy/fact 
 
Quantitative metrics of the annotated corpus are compiled in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 
shows the counts for the three sub-annotations, while Table 3 contains the aggregated 
results. Notably low is the proportion of second-order arguments: accounting for only 11 
out of a total of 505 inference relations. On the other end of the scale, the number of 
default inference classifications is uncomfortably high: 85 out of 505 inference relations 
have remained unclassified, amounting to 17% of the corpus. The main reason for the 
high number of default inferences is that a failure to classify a proposition or relation in 
any of the three annotation sub-tasks will cause the combination of the three sub-tasks to 
default into an unlabelled classification. In other words, if a proposition cannot be 
classified in terms of policy/value/fact, for example because it is too vague, or if the 
relation is not clearly first- or second-order, or if the propositions are incomplete to the 
extent that it’s not clear whether the subject or predicate is responsible for the 
transferring of justificatory force, then the aggregated final classification of the argument 
as a whole fails and defaults. 
 
																																																								4	The annotation of example (2) – taken from our corpus of the first General Election television debate on 
26 September 2016 in Hempstead, New York – is available online at aifdb.org/argview/10850.	
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Table 2: Counts of argument schemes in the US2016G1tvWAGEMANS corpus.
Argument scheme Count Argument scheme Count Argument scheme Count
Default inference 85 1 sub VF 23 1 sub VP 4
1 pre VV 78 1 sub FV 17 1 sub PV 3
1 pre VF 61 1 pre PF 15 2 pre FV 3
1 sub VV 50 1 sub FF 10 2 pre VF 2
1 pre FF 47 1 pre VP 8 2 pre VV 2
1 pre FV 27 1 sub PF 7 2 pre FF 1
1 pre PP 27 1 pre FP 5
1 pre PV 25 1 sub PP 5
only if COMMA paper is accepted: compare annotation to Walton schemes, as
indication of adequacy of present trivial naming in PTA, to suggest new namings, etc.
7 Applications of the corpus
Annotation with Wagemans’ typology has t advantage f the added value of partial
annotation on each dimension. This is most clear for the proposition type annotation.
relate to Park & Cardie’s work, and Freeman.
potential use for argument mining
qualitative evaluation of trivial labelling in Period Table: is the labelling in line
with existing classifications of argument schemes; what can be seen as ‘isotopes’ of
the elements identified in the Table?
quantitative empirical studies into the frequency of schemes use in particular con-
texts, and its correlation to particular argumentation structures
linguistic markers/indicators
future work: exploring dialogical aspects of arg schemes
8 Conclusion
We are awesome!
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Table 3. Aggregated results for the annotation of US2016G1tv with the Periodic Table of Arguments 
 
 
6. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The US2016G1tvWAGEMANS is the first corpus of argumentative discourse annotated 
on the basis of the Periodic Table of Arguments, and it is one of the largest and most 
reliably annotated corpora of argument schemes publicly available. We intend the corpus 
to provide a resource for the quantitative study of argument schemes, and for 
computational approaches to argumentation in particular. Elsewhere (Visser et al., 
2018b), we have reported on the annotation of the same source material (i.e. the 
US2016G1tv corpus) on the basis of Walton’s (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008) 
typology of argument schemes. The dual annotation of the same source material with two 
distinct typologies of argument schemes makes it possible to do comparative studies. For 
example, the dual annotation can be used to map the technical names of Wagemans’ 
Periodic Table of Arguments (e.g., 1 pre FF) to the colloquial names of argument 
schemes familiar from Walton’s typology (e.g., Argument from sign). This will expand 
the range of ‘isotopes’ in the Periodic Table: identifying the various sub-types of the 
larger classes delineated by the technical types (thereby creating the individual boxes in 
the four quadrants of Figure 1). A co-occurrence matrix, such as Table 4, can be used to 
look for regularities in the annotations based on the two typologies: it shows the number 
of arguments classified for the more common combination of the two typologies. 
Corpus-based studies can provide new insights into the dialogical nature of 
argument schemes, and how they are employed in different communicative contexts. The 
frequency of particular schemes can further characterise the argumentative preconditions 
of the activity type, and feed into the study of which prototypical argumentative patterns 
are actually stereotypical (van Eemeren, 2017). A closer look at the linguistic surface 
structure associated with a particular type of argument scheme can lead to a greater 
insight into the use of discourse markers indicative of argumentation (van Eemeren, 
Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007); which in turn would be highly valuable for 
argument mining – the automated reconstruction of argumentative content from a natural 
language text (Lawrence & Reed, 2015). Also for approaches to argument mining that do 
not rely on discourse markers, the availability of a robust annotated dataset is of great 
value for machine learning purposes (Peldszus & Stede, 2013).  
 
 
		 11 
 
 
Table 4. Co-occurrence matrix of the most common argument scheme annotations in 
US2016G1tvWALTON (columns) and US2016G1tvWAGEMANS (rows) 
 
An unavoidable difficulty in annotating argument schemes is posed by the fact that 
natural-language argumentation is not expressed in terms of categorical propositions or 
other abstractions. A reconstructive step is required to get from naturally expressed 
argument to the schematic abstractions that the typologies of argument schemes are based 
on. While technically possible, IAT annotation (see Section 3.2) ordinarily does not go 
into that reconstructive depth. The different approaches available to address this issue 
will be explored in future work.  
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